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Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of energy- and labour-productivity convergence at 
a detailed sectoral level for 14 OECD countries, covering the period 1970-1997. A s-
convergence analysis shows that the development of cross-country variation in productivity 
performance depends on the level of aggregation. Both patterns of convergence as well as 
divergence are found. A b-convergence analysis provides support for the hypothesis that in 
most sectors lagging countries tend to catch up with technological leaders, in particular in 
terms of energy productivity. Moreover, the results show that convergence is conditional 
rather than unconditional, meaning that productivity levels converge to country-specific 
steady states, and that cross-country differences of energy-productivity levels are 
substantially larger than of labour-prod ctivity levels at all levels of sectoral aggregation. 
Finally, searching for the fundamentals determining cross-c untry productivity differentials 
reveals a positive productivity effect of energy prices and economies of scale in several 
sectors, while wages, investment share, openness and specialization play only a very limited 
role in explaining (cross-country differences in) energy- and labour-productivity growth. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Economies differ, and so does productivity performance. Of course, economies also interact 
and, hence, productivity developments are thought to be determined not only by 
developments within a particular country or sector, but also by what is happening in the 
outside world. Therefore, a key issue in understanding long-run productivity performance is 
whether the process of economic growth tends to involve reductions in productivity 
differences among countries, for example, due to capital accumulation or technology 
transfers. The introduction of new or endogenous growth theories has generated renewed 
interest in this question and has induced a wave of empirical research on cross-country 
convergence of per capita income as well as of labour productivity or total factor productivity 
(e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, Mankiw et al. 1992, Islam 1995). This issue obviously 
bears important implications for the international welfare distribution. At the same time, over 
the last decades increasing attention is paid to the role of energy in production processes and 
economic growth. Energy consumption is an important source of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Most governments in OECD countries explicitly recognize the need for sustainable 
development and aim at a decoupling of economic growth and environmental pressure. In a 
more operational sense this implies that not only labour productivity, but also energy 
productivity have to increase. Consequently, important questions arise concerning the 
dynamics of cross-country differences of energy- and labour productivity. Are thes 
differences decreasing, or is the gap between leading and backward countries getting larger? 
Does energy-productivity convergence follow patterns of labour-productivity convergence? 
Do relatively inefficient countries catch-up with technological ‘leaders’? And if so, how 
quickly and by what means? Do convergence patterns differ substantially across sectors? We 
will answer these questions by simultaneously carrying out an empirical analysis of cross-
country energy- and labour-productivity convergence at a de ailed sector level, using a new 
dataset that merges energy data and economic data for 13 sectors and 14 OECD countries, 
covering the period 1970-1997. 
  In several respects, our paper differs from previous empirical research on cross-
country convergence. By including energy-productivity developments, our analysis differs 
from the empirical macroeconomic convergence literature that focuses on convergence of per 
capita income, labour productivity and total factor productivity. Moreover, in spite of many 
existing cross-country studies on energy-productivity or energy-intensity developments and 
its determinants (e.g., Howarth et al., 1991; Miketa, 2001; Schipper and Meyers, 1992; 
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Unander et al., 1999; Mulder and De Groot 2003), to the best of our knowledge this literature 
lacks a systematic convergence analyses from a macroeconomic perspective. Hence, we add 
to the existing literature a systematic comparison of energy- and labour-productivity 
convergence. Finally, we do so at a detailed sectoral level. By looking at cross-country 
convergence patters within sectors, our analysis differs from virtually all convergence studies 
in the empirical growth literature, since they employ aggregated data. Important exceptions 
are sectoral studies by Dollar and Wolff (1988, 1993) and Bernard and Jones (1996a,b) who 
- using (partly) the same data source (OECD’s ISDB) - conclude that a convergence analysis 
of aggregate productivity levels masks substantial differences at the sectoral level. An 
important underlying reason for this result is that productivity levels, measured as the ratio of 
value added over a unit of input (energy, labour), can substantially differ among sectors 
because some activities require inherently more capital, higher labour skills and/or 
technology than others. Aggregate productivity trends are therefore not directly attributable to 
technological change in individual sectors, as they can also be the result of changes in the 
distribution of production factors among sectors. Our sectoral approach corrects for most of 
the impact of such changes in the structure of production on aggregate productivity 
developments and, hence, establishes a closer link to issues concerning international 
convergence of technology driven productivity performance. Our analysis differs from the 
previously mentioned sectoral convergence analyses in comparing labour- and energy-
productivity convergence, in further disaggregating the manufacturing sector into 10 sub-
sectors,2 in using more recent data and in carrying out a more extensive s arch for country- 
and sector-specific factors to explain productivity convergence patterns.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of the convergence 
issue in the economic literature, in order to provide some theoretical backgr und to our 
empirical analysis and to introduce several concepts used throughout the paper. Section 3 
describes the data used. In section 4 we analyse the development of cross-country differences 
of energy- and labour-productivity levels within sectors over time. In section 5 we use a panel 
data approach to test the proposition that sectoral growth rates of energy- and labour 
productivity are inversely related to their initial levels of energy- and labour productivity, 
indicating possible patterns of catching-up. In addition, we try to identify the country- and 
                                                  
2 Although Dollar and Wolff (1988, 1993) distinguish 28 sectors, they only present a labour-productivity 
convergence indicator for a few years and did not perform a regression analysis to test for convergence patterns.  
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sector specific fundamentals determining (differences in) energy- a d labour productivity 
developments. Section 6 summarises and concludes.
 
2. THE ISSUE OF CONVERGENCE 
The concept of productivity convergence has its roots in traditional neoclassical growth 
theory, with its central notion of a transitional growth path to a steady state. The Solow-Sw n 
model (Solow 1956, Swan 1956) postulates convergence of per capita income, driven by the 
assumption of diminishing returns to capital accumulation at the economy-wid  level. The 
dynamics of the model imply that initial differences in per capita income and capital 
endowments will vanish in the long run, due to declining growth rates as countries approach 
their steady state. In the steady state, diminishing returns are offset by technological progress, 
the principal source of long-ru  economic growth. The new or endogenous growth theory 
(Lucas 1988 and Romer 1986, 1990) yields a more diverse picture conc rning patterns of 
convergence. In this view economic growth is ultimately driven by accumulation of 
knowledge or human capital, which is (at least partially) a public good. Hence, cross-country 
convergence depends on the extent of international knowledge spill- vers, allowing less 
productive countries to catch-up with more advanced economies. As such, endogenous 
growth theory supports the old hypothesis of the existence of an ‘advantage of backwardness’ 
(Gerschenkron 1952), suggesting that being relatively backward in productivity carries a 
potential for rapid advance (see, e.g., Abramovitz 1986). At the same time, endogenous 
growth theory suggests that growth differentials may persist or even increase: learning 
effects, externalities and market imperfections allow for economy-wide increasing returns to 
capital accumulation and the existence of multiple steady-states. A mixed view on 
convergence patterns also emerges if one takes into account the role of international trade: on 
the one hand trade will enhance cross-country convergence through knowledge diffusion and 
increasing competition, but on the other hand it may contribute to cross-co ntry divergence 
since trade advances international specialization (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991).  
 These various approaches generated some degree of controversy around the issue of 
convergence and caused the convergence hypothesis to be the subject of extensive empirical 
research (see Islam 2003 for a recent survey). The stage for this convergence debate was set 
by Baumol (1986), who reported a strong negative relationship between the intial level of 
labour productivity and its subsequent growth over a long period (1870-1979), which he 
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argued to be strong evidence in favour of convergence. Abramovitz (1986) presented similar 
evidence, arguing that catch-up growth has been most prominent in the period since 1945. 
This position was challenged by DeLong (1988) who argued that Baumol’s results suffered 
from a sample bias, in that his analysis has been confined to a sample ofc untries that have 
become rich and developed; if one takes a sample of countries that in 1870 seemed likely to 
converge, the evidence of convergence is less clear cut. In addition, a number of studies have 
presented evidence of income convergence across countrie , by explicitly testing (augmented 
versions of) the Solow growth model (e.g., Barro 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, 
Mankiw et al. 1992, Islam 1995). These empirical cross-count y growth analyses raised the 
important question of whether countries converge to a global or rather to a local steady state, 
the latter implying that convergence is conditional on cross-country differences in steady-
state characteristics. They are, respectively, referred to as unconditional (or absolute) and 
conditional (or relative) convergence. This idea has been formalised by Durlauf and Johnson 
(1992) and confirmed by several studies in this field, some of them suggesting the existence 
of convergence clubs: groups of countries converging to different steady states (e.g., Chatterji 
1992, Chatterji et al. 1993, Quah 1997).3 
 From this literature it follows that convergence can be understood in terms of levels 
and growth rates, which translates into a distinction between so-called s-convergence and b-
convergence (e.g., Barro 1991, Barro and Sala-i-M rtin 1992). The former refers to a 
decreasing variance of cross- ountry differences in productivity levels, while the latter 
suggests a tendency of countries with relatively low initial productivity levels to grow 
relatively fast, building upon the proposition that growth rates tend to decline as countries 
approach their steady state. Obviously, s-convergence and b-convergence are closely related. 
A narrowing dispersion of cross- ountry productivity differences implies that countries with 
a relatively poor initial productivity performance tend to grow relatively fast. However, as 
has been argued by Quah (1993), a statistically significant inverse relationship between the 
initial level and the growth rate of productivity performance can be consistent with constant 
or even increasing cross-c untry productivity differences – a phenomenon known as Galton’s 
                                                  
3 For more complete surveys of the convergence debate we refer to Barro and Sala-i-M rtin (1995), Broadberry 
(1996), Durlauf and Quah (1999), Fagerberg (1994), Economic Journal (1996) and Islam (2003). For more 
recent work on evidence of and driving forces behind convergence patterns see, for example, Baumol et al. 
(1994), van Ark and Crafts (1996), Kumar and Rusell (2002), Miller and Upadhyah (2002) and Tondl (2001) 
among many others. 
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Fallacy of regression towards the mean.4 In other words, b-convergence is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for s-convergence. In this paper we will explore both patterns of s-
convergence and b-convergence. Moreover, we test whether convergence is conditional or 
unconditional and which are the factors explaining (cross-country differences in) labour- and 
energy productivity growth.  
 
3. DATA 
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a newly constructed database that merges 
energy data from the Energy Balances as they are published by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and economic data from the International Sectoral Database (ISDB) and the 
Structural Analysis Database (STAN), both published by the OECD. The main idea behind 
the construction of this database is to establish a link between economic and energy data at a 
detailed sectoral level. This results in the sector cla sification as described in Table 1. 
 
< Insert Table 1 around here > 
 
The database covers the period 1970-1997 and includes the following countries: Australia 
(AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), 
West-Germany (WGR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), 
Sweden (SWE), United Kingdom (GBR) and the United States (USA). 
 We measure energy productivity by gross value added per unit of final energy 
consumption and labour productivity by gross value added per worker (in full time 
equivalents). Value added is the net economic output of a sector, measured by the price 
differential between the price of output and the cost of input and comprises compensation to 
employees, operating surplus, the consumption of fixed capital and the excess of indirect 
taxes over subsidies (OECD 1998). Following the IEA, energy use is defined as final energy 
consumption in kilo tonnes of oil equivalence (ktoe),5 with sectoral data excluding 
transformation losses. Total employment is measured in the full- ime equivalent number of 
persons, including self-employed.  
                                                  
4 See Bernard and Durlauf (1996) and Durlauf and Quah (1999) for further discussion of empirical 
methodological issues of convergence tests.  
5 Hence, we do not analyse explicitly the impact of changes in fuel mix on overall energy-efficiency 
improvements. 
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 Moreover, the database includes data on Investment, Energy Prices, Compensation of 
Employees, Export and Import – all at the sectoral level. The sector-speific energy prices are 
constructed by dividing sector-specific expenditures on energy over total sectoral energy 
consumption. The sector-specific expenditures are calculated as the product of the sectoral 
consumption of the four main energy carriers (Coal, Natural Gas, Electricity, Oil) – available 
from the Energy Balances – and the (annual) price of each energy carrier at the aggregate 
industrial sector – available from the IEA Energy Prices and Taxes series. In addition, some 
missing aggregate energy price data series have been constructed.6  
 All currency-denominated variables are in 1990 US$ and have been converted by the 
OECD using 1990 purchasing power parities. In principle the theoretically most appropriate 
conversion factors for productivity comparis ns t the sectoral level are to be based on a 
comparison of output prices by industry of origin, rather than on expenditure prices (see, for 
example, van Ark and Pilat 1993). Expenditure PPPs exclude the part of output that is 
exported, while they include imported goods produced elsewhere; they take account of 
differences in trade and transport margins and indirect taxes between countries, and they do 
not cover intermediate products. The main problem in using the production or industry-of-
origin approach, owever, is the limited availability of producer- ice based PPPs, in 
particular for non-Manufacturing sectors (van Ark 1993).7 Moreover, we have no a priori 
reason to presume that the drawbacks of expenditure PPPs differ substantially across 
countries. Hence, we follow most studies including cross-country productivity comparisons 
using expenditure PPPs, which enables us to do a systematic cross-country c nvergence 
analysis of energy- and labour-productivity performance at a high level of sectoral detail. 
Obviously, the results presented in this paper should be interpreted with caution, bearing in 
mind the before mentioned issues.8  
 
 
                                                  
6 Further details on the dataset, including descriptive statistics, are available upon request. 
7 This limited availability is due to some problems inherent to the industry-of-origin approach: producer prices 
(i.e., production values divided by output quantities) may not properly account for cross-country quality 
differences and imply aggregation problems for they are available only for a sample of goods (partly b cause f 
confidentiality problems), and because the production structure among countries tends to be less comparable 
than the consumption structure due to specialization tendencies in production according to comparative 
advantage (Pilat 1996). 
8 For a discussion of this issue in empirical analyses of convergence at the sectoral level see Sørensen (2001) 
and Bernard and Jones (2001). 
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4. s-CONVERGENCE  
This section deals with the notion of convergence in terms of levels. Do cross-country 
differences in energy- and labour-productivity levels decrease over time? Are patterns of 
energy-productivity convergence similar to those of labour-productivity convergence? And to 
what extent do the results depend on the level of aggregation? To answer these questions we 
calculated for each sector the unweighted cross-count y tandard deviation (s) of the log of 
energy- and labour productivity, among the 14 OECD countries (insofar as data are 
available).9 Figure 1 presents the degree of variation in ‘macroeconomic’ energy- and labou-
productivity levels, being the sum of aggregate Manufacturing, Transport, Services and 
Agriculture.10 The figure shows that cross- ountry differences in energy-productivity levels 
are substantially larger than cross-country differences of labour-pr ductivity levels. 
Moreover, it can be seen that over time the standard deviation of the log of energy-
productivity performance is increasing, indicating s-divergence, while the opposite is true for 
cross-country labour-p oductivity performance, displaying a pattern of s-convergence. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 around here > 
 
As we noted in the introduction, a convergence analysis at aggregate levels may mask 
considerable variation in sectoral productivity developments (cf. Bernard and Jones, 1996a,b, 
Dollar and Wolff 1988, 1993). Therefore, we continue by examining the development of 
cross-country productivity differentials within different sectors. 
 In Figures 2a and 2b we present the standard deviation of the log of, respectively, 
energy- and labour productivity for aggregate Manufacturing, Transport, Services and 
Agriculture.11  
 
                                                  
9 In the literature on convergence analysis, two measures for s-conv rgence are used interchangeably: (1) the 
standard eviation of the log of per capita income or productivity (y) and (2) the coefficient of variation which 
equals the standard deviation of per capita income or productivity divided by the sample average. Dalgaard and 
Vastrup (2001) show that these measures l d to different conclusions when applied to the Penn World Table 
caused by the fact that the measures assign different weights to individual countries’ performance. We have 
therefore used both measures in our convergence analysis, finding both measures to yield an identical pattern of 
convergence, although with small differences in the size of cross-country variance. Details are available upon 
request. Here, we only present the result of the SD log-measure (1).  
10 Due to limited data availability the calculation of cross-country dispersion, as shown in Figure 1, excludes 
Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
11 Due to limited data availability, the following countries are not included in the calculation of cross-country 
dispersion, shown in Figure 3. Manufacturing: Japan, the Netherlands; Agriculture: Japan, the Netherlands; 
Services: the Netherlands, Sweden; Transport: Canada, the Netherlands. 
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< Insert Figure 2a and 2b around here > 
 
From Figure 2a it can be seen that only Manufacturing resembles the macroeconomic pattern 
of s-divergence for energy productivity. Transport, Agriculture, and in particular Services, 
display evidence of s-convergence. Note that the level of cross-country variation is relatively 
high in Services, which is to a large extent due to the exceptional and so far unexplained 
energy-productivity performance of Finland and Italy.12 Figure 2b shows that the 
macroeconomic pattern of s-c nvergence for labour productivity is only evident in Services 
and to a lesser extent in the Agricultural sector. At the same time, variation in cross-coun ry 
productivity differentials remains overall fairly constant within aggregate Manufacturing and 
Transport (although with fluctuations over time).  
 Comparing Figures 2a and 2b shows again that in each sector the cross- oun ry 
variation of energy productivity is substantially larger than of labour productivity. These 
results do not change when the United States is removed from the sample. Moreover, they 
accord well with the findings of Bernard and Jones (1996a), who by means of a conclusion 
suggest “that international flows, associated mostly with Manufacturing, may not be 
contributing substantially to convergence either through capital accumulation or 
technological transfer” (Bernard and Jones 1996a:1230). Our analysis suggests that this 
conclusion holds even stronger for manufacturi g energy-productivity performance, where 
international flows cannot prevent an increase in cross-cou try differences of productivity 
levels. 
 This raises the question as to what the determinants of these cross-country
productivity differences are. In our search for an answer we subsequently take three steps. 
First, we go one step further in the s-convergence analysis than Bernard and Jones (1996a,b) 
by examining productivity convergence for a breakdown of aggregate Manufacturing in order 
to see to whetr the energy-productivity divergence and the lack of labour-productivity 
convergence observed in aggregate Manufacturing is also found within the different 
Manufacturing sub-sectors. Second, we perform a b-convergence analysis to test whether a 
statistically significant negative relationship exists between the initial level and the growth 
rate of productivity performance, in order to gain a better insight in the mechanism behind the 
                                                  
12 Excluding Finland and Italy from the sample for Services reduces the cross-country dispersion by about 40% 
while leaving the pattern of s-c nvergence unchanged. Note that the Netherlands also exhibits an exceptional 
development of energy-p oductivity performance in Services, but has already been excluded form the sample 
used in Figure 3a.
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observed convergence patterns. Third, we will try to explain (persistent) differences in cross-
country productivity growth by examining the role of different country-specific variables in 
driving energy- and labour-productivity growth at the sectoral level. The remaining part of 
this section is devoted to a s-convergence analysis for a breakdown of aggregate 
Manufacturing into 10 sub-sectors. The other issues are the subjects of section 4.  
 In Figures 3a and 3b we present the standard deviation of the log of, respectively, 
energy- and labour productivity for each of the 10 Manufacturing sub-sectors included in our 
dataset.13 Figure 3a reveals that the pattern of divergence in cross-cou try energy-
productivity performance at the level of aggregate Manufacturing is to be found only in Iron 
and Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals. On the contrary, Food, Machinery, Non-metallic Minerals 
(until 1980) and Textiles all display evidence of (strong) s-convergence. Cross-country 
productivity differences remain more or less constant in Non-Metallic Mi erals (after 1980), 
Chemicals, Transport Equipment, Paper and Wood.  
 From Figure 3b it can be seen that the lack of labour-productivity convergence in 
aggregate Manufacturing is the result of mixed convergence patterns in different 
manufacturing sectors. Chemicals, Iron and Steel, Non-ferrous Metals and Wood exhibit 
(strong) convergence, while Machinery shows the opposite pattern of divergence. The sectors 
Food, Non-Metallic Minerals, Textile, Paper and Transport Equipment display no clear 
evidence for either convergence or divergence, although the latter shows substantial 
fluctuations over time. Moreover, it is to be noted that in Chemicals, Iron and Steel, Non-
Ferrous Metals and Non-Metallic Minerals convergence of labour-prod ctivity performance 
is particularly strong during the first half of the 1980s. 
 
< Insert Figure 3a and 3b around here > 
 
In conclusion, we found cross- ountry variation of energy-productivity performance to be 
substantially higher than of labour-prod ctivity performance at all levels of sectoral 
aggregation, and in particular in Se v ces, Chemicals, Paper, Wood and at an ever increasing 
rate also in Iron and Steel and Non-Ferr us Metals. In Machinery, however, cross-country 
variation of energy- and labour-productivity differences has strongly converged, resulting in a 
                                                  
13 Due to limited data av il bility, the following countries are excluded from the calculation of cross-country 
dispersion, shown in Figure 4. Food: Australia and Canada; Iron and steel: Japan; Machinery: Canada, Japan, 
the Netherlands; Transport Equipment: Canada; Non-Ferrous Metals: Denmark; Paper: Australia, Japan; 
Textile: Canada; Wood: Canada, France, Japan, United Kingdom, United States.
 10
relatively small - although seemingly persistent - difference in the degree of cross-country 
variance. Moreover, convergence patterns turned out to depend on the level of aggregation, 
with different sectors displaying varying behaviour: some show reduction in variation, some 
increasing variation and others neither a clear reduction or increase in cross-country 
differences over the whole period. 
 These results suggest that different mechanisms may be at work in the different 
sectors. For example, the observed patterns of divergence might be the result of increasing 
international specialization while the tendency to converge might be caused by technology 
spill-overs from ‘leaders’ to ‘followers’, allowing lagging countries to catch-up. Moreover, 
our results suggest that determinants of energy-p oductivity growth and labour-pr ductivity 
growth might differ from each other, since we found no clear-cut (and sometimes even an 
opposite) relationship between cross-country convergence patterns in terms of energy 
productivity and labour productivity. Finally, even in those sectors showing evidence of 
convergence there remains substantial cross-count y productivity differences, in particular in 
terms of energy productivity. This suggests that convergence does not pertain to a uniform 
steady state for all countries. In order to further examine this issue, we continue in the next 
section with a search for empirical regularities in the productivity improvements over our 
cross-section of countries by testing for sectoral patterns of b-convergence. As part of that 
analysis we will also try to explain (differences in) energy- and labour-productivity growth. 
 
5. b–CONVERGENCE  
This section deals with the notion of convergence in terms of growth rates. In this case 
energy- and labour-productivity convergence implies that energy- and labour-productivity 
growth rates tend to decline if countries reach their steady states. Obviously, it is not an easy 
task – if possible at all – to judge whether a country is in its steady state or not. It is possible,
however, to analyse the correlation between growth rates and levels, assuming that a negative 
correlation between these two provides an indication for convergence, because it suggests 
that countries with relatively low initial energy- and labour-productivity levels catch-up to 
more advanced economies. Th  rationale behind this is that those countries lagging behind in 
terms of productivity levels can benefit from relatively high marginal factor productivity or 
from the experience and technologies develope  by the countries operating at the forefront. In 
this section we adopt a panel-d ta framework to regress average energy- and labour-
productivity growth rates on initial productivity levels, generating an estimate of the 
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coefficient b, for each sector. A negative estimated coefficient b indicates the existence of so-
called b-convergence. We start in section 5.1 by testing for unconditional convergence, 
assuming that energy- and labour productivity converge towards a unique steady state for all 
countries included in the data set. In section 5.2 we relax this assumption and test for 
conditional convergence, assuming productivity levels to converge towards multiple steady 
states that are conditional on country-specific characteristics. Finally, as part of this analysis 
we try to identify the country-specific characteristics that determine (differences in) energy- 
and labour-productivity growth across countries. 
  
5.1 Unconditional b-convergence 
We test for unconditional b-convergence by regressing for each sector the growth rate (g) of, 
respectively, energy- and labour productivity (y), on its initial level (and a constant a), 
generating an estimate of b, according to:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ittititiit yyyg eba ++=-= -- 1,1,, lnloglog   (1)  
with i and t denoting, respectively, the cross-country and the time-series dimension, 
while ite is the standard error. Following Islam (1995) we use five-year time intervals in order 
to reduce the influence of business-cycl  fluctuations and serial correlation of the error term. 
Hence, the growth rate (g) in equation (1) is an average over a five-ye r p riod (if t = 1975, 
for example, t-1 = 1970). The results are presented in Table 2. 
 
< Insert Table 2 around here > 
 
From the table it can be seen that we obtain a statistically significant negative estimate of b 
for energy-productivity growth in most sectors, except for Total (i.e., the macroeconomic 
level), Chemicals, Iron and Steel, Non-Ferr us Metals, Paper and Wood. In terms of labour-
productivity growth we found b to be statistically significant in all sectors, except for 
aggregate Manufacturing and Non-Ferr us Metals.14 
                                                  
14 We also estimated equation (1) including a period-specific fixed effect ht according to git = a + b ln(y)i,t–1 + ht 
+ eit . The regression results with these period dummies included do not substantially improve the estimates in 
most sectors, except for Non-Ferrous Metals and in terms of labour productivity also for Chemicals, Iron and 
Steel and Machinery. These findings suggest, that in spite of a few exceptions, in general there is not much 
evidence for substantial differences in growth rates between the time periods included. Details are available 
upon request. 
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 These results confirm the findings of Bernard and Jones (1996a) who also report lack 
of labour-productivity convergence in Manufacturing, weak evidence for convergence in 
Agriculture and strong evidence in Services. It is to be noted, however, that in most sectors 
that display evidence of convergence, estimates of b are rather small, indicating that lagging 
countries catch-up only very slow. Using the estimated values of b, the rate at which the 
productivity level is converging to a uniform productivity level can be derived (e.g., Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin 1992, Mankiw et al. 1992, Islam 1995). Let y* be the steady state 
productivity level and y(t) its actual value at any time . Approximating around the steady 
state, the speed of convergence is given by 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]tyy
dt
tyd
loglog
log
-= *l  (2)  
which implies that: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )0loglog1log yeyety tt ll -*- +-=   (3)  
where (y 0)) is energy- or labour productivity level at some initial date. Subtracting log (y(0)) 
from both sides yields 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]0loglog10loglog yyeyty t --=- *-l  (4)  
in which –(1–e–lt) = b. Hence, the speed of convergence, l, is given by l = – [1/T log(b+1)] 
with T denoting the time interval under consideration.15 The values of the implied l are 
shown in Table 2. They confirm the finding of a slow rate of convergence: the time t needed 
for energy productivity to move halfway its initial level (y(0)) and the steady state y* varies 
from 8 years (Textiles) to 225 years (Non-Ferrous metals); the half life for labour 
productivity lies in between 16 years (Wood) and 87 years (Manufacturing).16  
 As previously noted, b-convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for s-
convergence. Our findings confirm that those sectors showing evidence of s-conv rg nce 
(see section 4) also display evidence of b-convergence: a decreasing cross-country variation 
of productivity levels implies by definition that countries with relatively low initial energy- 
and labour-productivity levels grow relatively fast. However, the opposite is not necessarily 
true, as is illustrated for labour productivity by the sectors Machinery, Non-Metallic Minerals 
and Textiles: they pass the test for b-convergence without showing evidence of s-
convergence (see Figure 3b).  
                                                  
15 Since we use five-year time intervals, T = 5 in our analysis. Note that in Isl m (1995) l = –[(1/T)ln(b)] due to 
the fact that he takes ln(y)it i stead of [ln(y)it – ln(y)it- 1] as dependent variable. 
16 The half life (H) is derived from e–lH = 0.5 Û H = ln(2) / l 
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 Finally, it is to be noted that the ability of the simple regression equation (1) to 
explain cross-country productivity growth rates is rather small in most sectors. This is not 
surprising since the specification of equation (1) implicitly builds upon the assumption that 
energy- and labour-productivity levels converge towards a uniform steady state. However, 
economies differ and so do (most likely) their steady states. Contrary to a framework of 
single cross-country regressions, a panel data framework is capable of allowing for cross-
country differences in steady states in the form of unobservable individual ‘country-effects’
(Islam 1995). These country-effects might include all sorts of country-specific tangible and 
intangible factors that affect productivity growth and which have not been included in 
equation (1) or, to state it differently, have been subsumed in its error term. Therefore, in the 
next section we test for b-c nvergence allowing for these ‘country-effects’. 
  
5.2 Conditional b-convergence 
We test for conditional b-convergence by including (unspecified) individual country-effects 
in equation (1), assuming that productivity levels converge to country-specifi  steady states. 
Hence, we reformulate equation (1) into a panel-data model with individual country effects, 
according to:  
 ( ) ititiit yg emb ++= -1,ln  (5) 
with mi representing unspecified country-specific (fixed) effects. In Table 3 we present – for 
each sector – the estimated coefficient b ob ained from equation (5).  
 
< Insert Table 3 around here > 
 
The table shows that allowing for individual country-effects substantially improves the 
explanatory power of the regression equations for both energy- and labour productivity. 
Moreover, in terms of energy productivity, equation (5) yields significantly negative 
estimates of b in all sectors, including now also Total (i.e., the macroeconomic level), 
Chemicals, Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metals and Machinery. Also in terms of labour 
productivity the estimates of b are higher in several sectors such as, for example, Services 
and Food. The evidence on conditional labour-productivity convergence is, however, less 
clear-cut than it is for energy-p oductivity convergence: in some sectors such as, for example, 
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Iron and Steel and Machinery, allowing for individual country-effects in explaining labour-
productivity growth yields statistically less significant or even insignificant estimates of b.  
 This result suggests that in terms of labour productivity the variation in explanatory 
variables over time is relatively small as compared to cross-country differences, since 
correcting for the latter by means of including country-specific intercepts results in weaker 
evidence of a negative relationship between the initial labour productivity level and its 
growth over time. Nevertheless, the regression results suggest that both energy- and labour-
productivity convergence depend to a large extent on individual country-effects, indicating 
energy- and labour productivity to be conditional rather than absolute in virtually all sectors. 
The latter is illustrated by the fact that the speed of conditional convergence is substantially 
higher than of unconditional convergence: for energy productivity the half life, as it follows 
from the implied l, now lies between 1 year (Transport Equipment) and 14 years (Total) and 
for labour productivity it has been reduced to a period in between 47 years (Transport 
Equipment) and 77 years (Non-Ferrous Metals). 
 Of course, this brings back the question as to which are the country-specifi  variables 
driving energy- and labour-productivity growth and, hence, determining the country-spe ific 
steady states? Recall from the introduction that several mechanisms may be at work, causing 
‘followers’ to grow faster than ‘leaders’: advanced economies may suffer from diminishing 
returns, lagging countries may benefit from knowledge spill-overs, production processes may 
convergence due to increasing competition, etcetera.  
 In order to explain (persistent) differences in cross-count y energy- and labour-
productivity growth we replace in equation (5) the unspecified country-eff cts mi by a number 
of country-specific explanatory variables jix , according to:  
 ( ) it
j
j
itjtiit xyg egba +++= å
=
-
5
1
1,ln  (6) 
The specified explanatory variables are defined at the sectoral level and include: 
 Energy prices:   
( )
3
2,1,,1 -- ++= tEtEtEait
ppp
x   
 Wages:   ( )
3
211 -- ++= tttbit
www
x   
 Investment share:  
Y
I
xit =
2   
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where sectoral indices are omitted for reasons of expositional clarity and with energy prices 
( aitx1 ) or wages (
b
itx
1 ) included, respectively, in case of explaining energy-productivity growth 
or labour-productivity growth. We expect energy prices and wages to be positively correlated 
with, respectively, energy- and labour-productivity growth. We took a three-yea  moving 
average for the energy price and wages to avoid capturing the effect of short-term price 
fluctuations, assuming that investments in energy- and labour-augmenting technologies do 
respond to a structural trend in energy price/wage developments rather than to short term 
fluctuations. By including the investment share as an explanatory variable we test for the so-
called embodiment hypothesis or a vintage effect, assuming that higher investment will 
contribute to increasing energy- and labour-productivity growth via technological change 
embodied in new capital goods (see, for example, Howarth et al. 1991 and Mulder et al. 
2003). We expect openness to have a positive impact on productivity growth, since an open 
sector faces relatively strong competition as well as exchange of knowledge, which we both 
assume to have a stimulating effect on productivity growth. The Balassa index is an indictor 
measuring relative specialization patterns. We expect that if a country specializes in a 
particular sector, that that sector will be technologically relatively advanced, and hence we 
expect a positive effect on productivity. Finally, including an indicator for the relative size of 
a sector within a country captures the potential effect of economies of scale on productivity 
growth, assuming that a large sector is able to invest relatively much in R&D and in new 
capital goods and, hence, might be a technological leader displaying relatively high 
productivity growth rates. 
 The results of regressing average energy-productivity growth rates on initial energy 
productivity levels and these additional explanatory variables, according to equation 6, are 
presented in Table 4.17 
                                                  
17 We also controlled for different specifications of energy prices (current prices, 5-year moving average, and 
log 3-year and log 5-year moving average), investment share ((I/Y)t-1, (I/K), (I/K)t-1 and ln(I/K)t-1), as well as an 
interaction term of investment share and log initial energy productivity (ln(Y/E)0* (I/Y)). A l these specifications 
did not substantially alter the estimates. Details are available upon request. 
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< Insert Table 4 around here > 
 
It can be seen that the regression analysis generates significantly negative estimates of b in 
Agriculture, Transport, Iron and Steel, Machinery, Non-Metallic Minerals, Paper and 
Textiles. Compared to Table 3 this means that in 6 sectors the estimate of b is no longer 
statistically significant once we include the previously mentioned specified explanatory 
variables. The effect of investment share, openness, specialization, and economies of scale on 
energy-productivity growth is mixed and their impact is statistically insignificant in virtually 
all sectors. An exception is the energy-price effect, which has in all sectors the expected 
(positive) sign, while the positive impact of energy prices on energy-productivity growth is 
statistically significant in Chemicals, Iron and Steel and Papr, which makes sense since 
these are energy intensive sectors. Finally, the speed of convergence has slowed down with 
the half life increased to a minimum of 5 years (Wood) and a maximum of 41 years 
(Chemicals).  
 In Table 5 we present the results of regressing average labour-productivity growth 
rates on initial labour-productivity levels and the five additional explanatory variables, 
according to equation (6).  
 
< Insert Table 5 around here > 
 
Table 5 shows statistically significantly negative estimates of b for Agriculture, Food and 
Textiles only. Similar to energy-productivity growth, the effect of the investment share, 
openness, specialization, and economies of scale on labour-pr ductivity growth is mixed 
while their impact is statistically insignificant in virtually all sectors (or it is statistically 
significant with an unexpected sign such as, for example, in case of the ‘vintage effect’ in 
Agriculture, Iron and Steel, Transport Equipment and Wood, and economies of scale in 
Services). Finally, the speed of convergence has slowed down with the half life increasing to 
in between 12 years (Textiles) and 95 years (Machinery), while for Services the estimate 
yields a positive b , implying divergence.  
 In sum, while there is strong evidence of conditional convergen e in terms of both 
energy- and labour-productivity growth (see Table 3), we found energy prices and in 
particular wages, investment share, openness, specialization and economies of scale to play 
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only a limited role in explaining energy- and labour-productivity growth and, hence, in 
determining cross-country productivity differentials. The results shown in Tables 4 and 5 
might, however, suffer from an omitted variable bias if the included explanatory variables are 
correlated with the unspecified country-effects mi, which are excluded from equation (6). 
Hence, to correct for this potential bias, we add the unspecified individual country-effects to 
equation (6), according to 
 ( ) iti
j
j
itjtiit xyg emgba ++++= å
=
-
5
1
1,ln  (7) 
The results of this regression model for energy-productivity growth are presented in Table 6. 
  
< Insert Table 6 around here > 
 
It can be seen that adding the unspecified country effects again affects the estimates 
substantially. The estimation results in Table 6 show that except for Food, Non-Ferrous 
Metals and Wood all sectors yield a statistically significant estimate of b, w th r gression 
equation (7) displaying a much better goodness of fit in most sectors than equation (6) (see 
Table 4). Except for Food and Non-Ferrous Metals, the speed of convergence has increased 
considerably as compared to Table 4 with the half-life to be between 1 and 5 years in all other 
sectors. The statistically significant energy-pric  effect is robust in Iron and Steel and in 
Paper, while in Chemicals the null hypothesis of no effect is only just rejected at the 10% 
level. In addition, energy prices also seem to have a statistically significant positive effect on 
energy-productivity growth in Services and Textiles. The impact of the other explanatory 
variables on energy-productivity growth remains mixed, with economies of scale having the 
largest statically significant effect on energy productivity growth, being positive in Services, 
Chemicals and Transport Equipment, while negative in Textiles. We found the vintage effect 
and openness to have a statistically significant positive effect in Transport Equipment only, 
while for specialization this is only the case in Iron and Steel.  
 In Table 7 we present the regression results of equation (7) for lab ur-productivity 
growth.  
 
< Insert Table 7 around here > 
 
 18
It can be seen that in most sectors also labour-productivity growth is better explained if we 
account for country-specific fixed effects. Moreover, the speed of convergence increased in 
most sectors as compared to Table 5, with the half-lif between 4 years (Transport) and 36 
years (Agriculture), and with Machinery as the most important exception (with its half life 
increasing to 367 years). Table 7 shows that wages have a statistically significant positive 
effect on labour-productivity growth in Agriculture and Textiles, while this is negative in 
Transport Equipment. Moreover, similar to energy-productivity growth, the impact of the 
other explanatory variables on labour-productivity growth remains m xed, with economies of 
scale having again the largest statistically significant effect, being positive in Transport, Non-
Ferrous Metals and Paper, while it is again negative in Textiles. We found openness to have a 
statistically significant positive effect in Paper only, while for specialization this is again only 
the case in Iron and Steel. Finally, the results do not give any support to the vintage effect, 
with the only statistically significant estimates displaying a negative sign. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper extends the existing empirical analyses of convergence patterns by providing a 
systematic comparison of energy- and labour-productivity convergence at a detailed sectoral 
level for 14 OECD countries, covering the period 1970-1997. A s-convergence analysis 
revealed that the development of the cross-country variation in energy- and labour-
productivity performance depends on the level of aggregation, with different patterns of 
productivity convergence and divergence across sectors. At the macroeconomic level we 
found evidence of energy-p oductivity divergence, driven by aggregate Manufacturing, as 
well as labour-p oductivity convergence, mainly driven by Services. The Manufacturing 
energy-productivity divergence turns out to be caused by the Iron and St el and the Non-
Ferrous Metals sectors. Moreover, despite a lack of evidence of labour-productivity 
convergence at the aggregate Manufacturing level, there is evidence of labour-productivity 
convergence in several Manufacturing sub-sectors, with Machinery as the most important 
exception in that it shows a clear pattern of divergence (in particular after 1985). A b-
convergence analysis, using a panel-dat  approach, led tot the conclusion that in most sectors 
energy-productivity growth is relatively high in countries with relatively low initial 
productivity levels, while in several sectors this is also true for labour productivity. This 
result supports the hypothesis that relatively backward countries tend to catch-up o more 
advances economies, in particular in terms of energy productivity, possibly because they n 
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benefit from the experience and technologies developed by the countries operating at the 
forefront.  
 However, in spite of the evidence of convergence, cross-country differences in 
energy- and labour-productivity performance seem to be persistent. Our b-convergence 
analysis has shown convergence to be conditional on cross-country differences in steady-st te 
characteristics, rather than to be unconditional with productivity levels converging to a 
uniform steady state for all countries. This is in line with the results of our s-convergence, 
which indicated that cross-country differences in productivity levels remain to exist, even in 
those sectors that display a convergence pattern. Moreover, we found that the speed of 
energy-productivity convergence is in general higher than the speed of labour-productivity 
convergence, in particular if we account for (unspecified) country-specific characteristics. 
Nevertheless, at the same time cross-country differenc s in energy-productivity levels were 
found to be still substantially larger than cross-country differences in labour-pr ductivity 
levels at all levels of sectoral aggregation.  
 In our search for the country- and sector-specific fundamentals determining these 
(differences in) energy- and labour productivity developments, we found energy prices to 
stimulate energy-productivity growth in the energy–intensive sectors while we did not find 
much evidence of a positive relationship between wages and labour-productivity growth. 
Moreover, our data show the cross-country differences in wages to be considerably larger 
than cross-country differences in final energy prices (measured by the standard deviation of 
the log of each variable). Hence, they are not likely to explain the persistent relatively high 
cross-country differences in energy-productivity levels as compared to labour-productivity 
levels. In addition, we found economies of scale to contribute to energy- and labour-
productivity growth in several sectors, while investment share, openness and specialization 
play only a very limited role in explaining (cross-country) differences in energy- and labour-
productivity growth. Hence, there is a need for additional research to further explain sectoral 
trends in energy- and labour-productivity growth across countries. 
 A possible explanation for the relatively high variation in energy-productivit  levels 
across countries might be that cross-country differences in environmental awareness 
(influenced by social pressure) or stringency of environmental policies cause energy-
efficiency improvements to be a matter of urgency at different degrees in different countries. 
Another reason might be a lack of international diffusion of energy-saving t chnologies as 
compared to technologies enhancing labour productivity. This can be caused by the fact that, 
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in contrast with labour costs, in most sectors energy costs form only a small part of total 
production costs and, hence, firms do not have the incentive to search for best-practice 
technologies at the international market, as opposed to labour-augmenting technologies.  
 In any case, since productivity growth is primarily driven by technological change, 
our results suggest that patterns of international technology flows do exist, while at th  same 
time they seem to be limited and at least to some extent sector-specific. There is some reason 
to believe that technology diffusion and knowledge spillovers are local rather than global (cf. 
Keller, 2002). This suggests the need for specific attention to be paid to the spatial dimension 
of technology diffusion in driving energy- and labour-productivity growth in different 
countries.  
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Figure 1 Standard deviation of log energy- and labour productivity at the macroeconomic level (including 
aggregate Manufacturing, Transport, Services and Agriculture) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a Standard deviation of log energy productivity in main sectors 
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Figure 2b Standard deviation of log labour productivity in main sectors 
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Figure 3a Standard deviation of log energy productivity in Manufacturing sectors 
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Figure 3b Standard deviation of log labour productivity in Manufacturi g sectors 
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Table 1 Sector Classification 
 Sector Abbreviation ISIC Rev. 2 code 
    
1 Food and Tobacco FOD 31 
2 Textiles and Leather TEX 32 
3 Wood and Wood Products WOD 331
a
 
4 Paper, Pulp and Printing PAP 34 
5 Chemicals CHE 351+352 b 
6 Non-Metallic Minerals NMM 36 
7 Iron and Steel IAS 371 
8 Non-Ferrous Metals NFM 372 
9 Machinery MAC 381+382+383 c 
10 Transport Equipment  MTR 384 
11 Construction CST 50 
12 Services SRV 61+62+63+72+81+82+83+90 d 
13 Transport TAS 71 
14 Agriculture AGR 10 
 a
 WOD excludes furniture since the sector WOD in the IEA Energy Balances excludes furniture 
b
 CHE includes non-energetic energy consumption, i.e. using energy carriers as feedstock.  
c
 MAC = Metal Products (BMA, 381) + Agricultural and Industrial Machinery (MAI, 382) + Electrical Goods (MEL, 383); 
d
 SRV = Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels (RET) + Communication (COM) + Finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services (FNI) + Community, social and personal services (SOC). 
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Table 2 Unconditional b-convergence 
 Energy  Labour 
 bE R2 Implied l  bL R2 Implied l 
        
Total - 0.0368 0.03 0.0075  - 0.1138*** 0.30 0.0242 
 (0.0246)    (0.0218)   
Agriculture - 0.3227*** 0.33 0.0779  - 0.0575* 0.03 0.0118 
 (0.0598)    (0.0300)   
Services - 0.1432*** 0.26 0.0309  - 0.1445*** 0.44 0.0312 
 (0.0424)    (0.0300)   
Transport - 0.0827** 0.12 0.0173  - 0.1046** 0.10 0.0221 
 (0.0312)    (0.0465)   
Manufacturing - 0.1524*** 0.16 0.0331  - 0.0392 0.00 0.0080 
 (0.0459)    (0.0324)   
        
Chemicals - 0.0190 0.01 0.0038  - 0.1027*** 0.12 0.0217 
 (0.0436)    (0.0366)   
Food and Tobacco - 0.0782** 0.07 0.0163  - 0.1058** 0.12 0.0224 
 (0.0385)    (0.0401)   
Iron and Steel - 0.0442 0.01 0.0090  - 0.1060* 0.05 0.0224 
 (0.0557)    (0.0461)   
Machinery - 0.1729*** 0.17 0.0380  - 0.1263** 0.12 0.0270 
 (0.0557)    (0.0461)   
Transport Equipment - 0.3082*** 0.21 0.0737  - 0.1480* 0.07 0.0320 
 (0.0823)    (0.0834)   
Non-Ferrous Metals - 0.0153 0.00 0.0031  - 0.0683 0.03 0.0141 
 (0.0617)    (0.0494)   
Non-Metallic Minerals - 0.3156*** 0.24 0.0758  - 0.1459*** 0.12 0.0315 
 (0.0761)    (0.0536)   
Paper, Pulp and Printing - 0.0435 0.03 0.0089  - 0.0755** 0.06 0.0157 
 (0.0355)    (0.0376)   
Textiles and Leather - 0.3497*** 0.19 0.0861  - 0.1577*** 0.18 0.0343 
 (0.1020)    (0.0433)   
Wood and Wood Products - 0.0236 0.01 0.0048  - 0.1925*** 0.29 0.0428 
 (0.0349)    (0.0381)   
        
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
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Table 3 Unspecified conditional b-convergence 
 Energy  Labour 
 bE R
2 
Implied l  bL R
2
 Implied l 
        
Total - 0.2214*** 0.19 0.0501  - 0.1068*** 0.58 0.0226 
 (0.0691)    (0.0262)   
Agriculture - 0.4797*** 0.49 0.1307  - 0.0831* 0.22 0.0174 
 (0.0888)    (0.0431)   
Services - 0.2181** 0.44 0.0492  - 0.1783*** 0.80 0.0393 
 (0.1169)    (0.0422)   
Transport - 0.6301*** 0.42 0.1989  - 0.1040 0.16 0.0220 
 (0.1593)    (0.1115)   
Manufacturing - 0.6162*** 0.67 0.1915  - 0.0553 0.16 0.0114 
 (0.0680)    (0.0382)   
        
Chemicals - 0.2620*** 0.33 0.0608  - 0.0929* 0.29 0.0195 
 (0.0836)    (0.0484)   
Food and Tobacco - 0.5180*** 0.36 0.1460  - 0.1879*** 0.49 0.0416 
 (0.1292)    (0.0542)   
Iron and Steel - 0.3889*** 0.32 0.0985  - 0.0642 0.11 0.0133 
 (0.1113)    (0.1055)   
Machinery - 0.2305* 0.31 0.0524  - 0.0549 0.45 0.0113 
 (0.1365)    (0.0499)   
Transport Equipment - 0.9504*** 0.68 0.6008  - 0.3104** 0.23 0.0743 
 (0.1127)    (0.1253)   
Non-Ferrous Metals - 0.5924*** 0.38 0.1795  - 0.0439 0.10 0.0090 
 (0.1426)    (0.0932)   
Non-Metallic Minerals - 0.5087*** 0.55 0.1421  - 0.2089*** 0.39 0.0469 
 (0.0980)    (0.0635)   
Paper, Pulp and Printing - 0.6513*** 0.60 0.2107  - 0.1053 0.24 0.0223 
 (0.1033)    (0.0783)   
Textiles and Leather - 0.8612*** 0.60 0.3949  - 0.2330*** 0.33 0.0531 
 (0.1285)    (0.0545)   
Wood and Wood Products - 1.0637*** 0.60 --  - 0.2298*** 0.47 0.0522 
 (0.1941    (0.0650)   
        
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
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Table 4 Specified conditional b-convergence energy productivity 
 b Energy 
Price 
Investment 
share 
Open Balassa Value 
added 
share 
R
2
 F-stat Implied l 
Agriculture - 0.1995* 0.0394 - 1.0158   - 2.2995 0.15 1.10 0.0445 
 (0.1136) (0.7225) (0.8969)   (2.1086)    
Services - 0.2296 - 0.0147 0.0714   0.3858 0.45 2.25 0.0522 
 (0.1791) (0.5612) (0.918)   (0.9388)    
Transport - 0.2350*** 0.1168 0.7991**   4.1693** 0.46 3.87 0.0536 
 (0.0655) (0.1439) (0.3266)   (1.6905)    
Chemicals - 0.0820 1.3526** 0.9093 - 0.0427 0.1631 - 4.8405 0.28 1.39 0.0171 
 (0.0819) (0.5008) (1.2271) (0.0335) (0.1661) (8.5819)    
Food - 0.1211 0.2130 - 0.5277 - 0.0432 0.0113 5.5691 0.35 1.79 0.0258 
 (0.0745) (0.4951) (0.9092) (0.0363) (0.0308) (3.829)    
Iron and Steel - 0.3377** 1.9263** - 0.8636 - 0.0251 0.0068 - 9.5859 0.44 2.79 0.0824 
 (0.1252) (0.7689) (0.7094) (0.0184) (0.1095) (10.7085)    
Machinery - 0.2042*** 0.4170 0.7337 0.0131 - 0.1112 2.3311 0.43 2.48 0.0457 
 (0.0684) (0.4823) (1.7063) (0.0345) (0.1997) (1.6439)    
Transport Equipment - 0.2855 
(0.1888) 
- 0.1642 
(0.729) 
0.4689 
(1.6648) 
0.0011 
(0.0472) 
0.2225 
(0.2079) 
- 8.1921 
(13.7238) 
0.25 0.79 0.0672 
Non-Ferrous Metals - 0.0844 
(0.2229) 
0.3943 
(0.5285) 
0.0573 
(0.2724) 
- 0.0307 
(0.0208) 
- 0.0943 
(0.1549) 
- 0.4460 
(36.3853) 
0.20 0.75 0.0176 
Non-Metallic Minerals - 0.4561*** 
(0.1611) 
1.8238 
(1.0916) 
0.0505 
(1.1821) 
- 0.0336 
(0.1062) 
0.2064 
(0.2016) 
- 36.2293* 
(20.1039) 
0.32 1.63 0.1218 
Paper - 0.1118* 0.6632** - 0.8569 - 0.0740 - 0.0643 7.5805 0.47 2.76 0.0237 
 (0.0613) (0.3052) (0.8666) (0.0527) (0.0723) (6.1778)    
Textiles  - 0.3656* - 0.4195 0.3092 - 0.0497 0.2136 - 11.7071 0.29 1.29 0.0910 
 (0.2053) (0.783) (3.1265) (0.0368) (0.2621) (19.7875)    
Wood - 0.4686 - 0.8418 - 2.7443 - 0.1293* 0.0229 - 53.1902 0.51 1.23 0.1264 
 (0.3351) (0.5508) (2.2403) (0.0699) (0.0667) (34.2262)    
          
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
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Table 5 Specified conditional b-convergence labour productivity  
 b Wage Investment 
share 
Open Balassa Value 
added 
share 
R
2
 F-stat Implied l 
Agriculture - 0.1050** 0.0315 - 0.6869**   0.2704 0.24 2.48 0.0222 
 (0.0456) (0.4028) (0.3014)   (0.8205)    
Services 0.0450 0.0032 0.1665   - 0.6100*** 0.70 8.07 - 0.0088 
 (0.0616) (0.0028) (0.1467)   (0.2173)    
Transport - 0.1778 0.0805 0.1422   0.9614 0.19 1.26 0.0392 
 (0.1123) (0.1180) (0.3348)   (1.8576)    
Chemicals - 0.1037 0.1050 - 0.1674 - 0.0111 0.0978 - 2.8729 0.20 1.21 0.0219 
 (0.076) (0.2568) (0.3365) (0.0196) (0.0951) (4.5006)    
Food - 0.2054** 0.2028 - 0.3856 0.0167 - 0.0003 - 0.8228 0.33 2.22 0.0460 
 (0.0822) (0.1436) (0.5348) (0.0258) (0.0212) (2.5040)    
Iron and Steel - 0.1224 
(0.0748) 
- 0.2134 
(0.5454) 
- 0.6313** 
(0.2447) 
0.0074 
(0.0113) 
0.0554 
(0.1089) 
- 4.4848 
(7.5135) 
0.34 2.44 0.0261 
Machinery - 0.0360 0.0227 - 2.9856 0.0183 - 0.1914 - 0.3505 - 0.14 0.53 0.0073 
 (0.1253) (0.1023) (1.8858) (0.0328) (0.2035) (1.2179)    
Transport Equipment 0.3188 
(0.3182) 
- 0.8364 
(0.6482) 
- 1.3317* 
(0.7010) 
- 0.0106 
(0.0188) 
0.5252 
(0.3654) 
- 8.1424 
(6.8885) 
0.51 1.20 - 0.0553 
Non-Ferrous Metals - 0.0531 
(0.0672) 
- 0.5926 
(1.2052) 
- 0.0312 
(0.1540) 
0.0085 
(0.0114) 
- 0.0279 
(0.0575) 
21.6064 
(25.3957) 
0.10 0.52 0.0109 
Non-Metallic Minerals - 0.1192 
(0.1140) 
0.0392 
(0.5893) 
- 0.6816 
(0.5820) 
0.0169 
(0.0629) 
- 0.0028 
(0.0968) 
5.3651 
(10.2905) 
0.12 0.61 0.0254 
Paper - 0.0946 0.0711 - 0.7480 0.0504 0.0047 3.1122 0.37 2.63 0.0199 
 (0.1009) (0.1254) (0.4340) (0.0378) (0.0208) (2.9214)    
Textiles  - 0.2539*** 0.0173 0.3843 - 0.0194 - 0.0088 - 4.8024 0.46 3.88 0.0586 
 (0.0755) (0.2092) (1.1500) (0.0158) (0.078) (6.2200)    
Wood - 0.1102 - 0.2230 - 0.8868** - 0.0175 - 0.0030 8.9504 0.30 1.65 0.0234 
 (0.1214) (0.7199) (0.4077) (0.0321) (0.0155) (6.0659)    
          
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
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Table 6 Conditional b-convergence energy productivity, specified, fixed effects 
 b Energy 
Price 
Investment 
share 
Open Balassa Value 
added share 
R
2
 F-stat Implied l 
Agriculture - 0.8615*** 1.3546 0.2182   12.3662 0.64 9.54 0.3954 
 (0.1965) (1.1801) (1.1274)   (7.6932)    
Services - 0.8039*** 1.1183* - 0.5308   7.1791** 0.81 9.88 0.3258 
 (0.238) (0.6375 (0.7828)   (3.2129)    
Transport - 0.5122* 0.0540 - 0.0171   16.8394 0.80 15.84 0.1436 
 (0.2604) (0.1633) (0.3651)   (4.3809)    
Chemicals - 0.7638*** 0.7270 1.7622 0.0023 - 0.4818 76.7954*** 0.88 19.29 0.2886 
 (0.1475) (0.4416) (1.0992) (0.0323) (0.3812) (13.9899)    
Food - 0.0403 1.0346 - 0.5494 - 0.2596** - 0.5764 - 0.7585 0.63 4.13 0.0082 
 (0.3799) (0.7692) (1.0185) (0.1147) (0.394) (10.9498)    
Iron and Steel - 0.8670*** 
(0.1679) 
3.8639*** 
(1.2861) 
- 1.3162** 
(0.6329) 
0.0052 
(0.031) 
0.9330*** 
(0.2287) 
- 5.4317 
(18.3749) 
0.85 14.58 0.4035 
Machinery - 0.5964** - 0.3718 3.8541 0.1009 0.6565 3.7735 0.66 4.62 0.1815 
 (0.2732) (1.1718) (3.208) (0.0971) (0.8200) (5.8699)    
Transport Equipment - 1.1444*** -1.6712*** 3.4196** 0.2016*** 0.2657 57.3976** 0.84 8.30 --- 
 (0.2930) (0.5916) (1.4195) (0.0718) (0.5175) (26.7348)    
Non-Ferrous Metals - 0.0262 
(0.2872) 
0.5837 
(1.1114) 
0.0350 
(0.429) 
- 0.0494 
(0.0552) 
0.0833 
(0.2178) 
132.9891 
(80.1969) 
0.56 2.76 0.0053 
Non-Metallic Minerals - 0.9527*** 
(0.1758) 
0.2167 
(1.593) 
1.3573 
(1.2800) 
0.0321 
(0.1503) 
- 0.1779 
(0.2079) 
- 17.6544 
(32.8798) 
0.80 10.53 0.6102 
Paper - 0.4712** 1.0724* - 0.9484 - 0.0681 - 0.0111 - 5.335 0.73 5.91 0.1274 
 (0.2015) (0.567) (1.0232) (0.1107) (0.0879) (19.1876)    
Textiles  - 0.7502*** 2.4389* 3.1294 - 0.1738*** 0.3466 - 49.3355** 0.79 8.35 0.2774 
 (0.2705) (1.284) (2.6318) (0.0544) (0.2923) (21.5613)    
Wood - 0.5676 - 0.9473 - 0.1751 - 0.1839 0.0299 68.6120 0.82 1.76 0.1677 
 (1.8578) (1.054) (6.9099) (0.4739) (0.1620) (333.4143)    
          
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
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Table 7 Conditional b-convergence labour productivity, specified, fixed effects 
 b Energy 
Price 
Investment 
share 
Open Balassa Value 
added 
share 
R
2
 F-stat Implied l 
Agriculture - 0.0915 1.3847* - 0.7385*   - 0.2200 0.57 10.11 0.0192 
 (0.0595) (0.8037) (0.3722)   (2.8331)    
Services - 0.1663 - 0.0038 - 0.0671   0.0866 0.83 16.20 0.0364 
 (0.1190) (0.0077) (0.1744)   (0.8378)    
Transport - 0.5373*** 0.4192 - 0.4716   21.6825*** 0.74 14.90 0.1541 
 (0.1551) (0.3580) (0.3011)   (4.0113)    
Chemicals - 0.6136*** 0.5821 - 0.2272 0.0169 0.0073 58.5063 0.65 7.97 0.1902 
 (0.1461) (0.5868) (0.3363) (0.0278) (0.2747) (15.9523)    
Food - 0.1863 0.2232 - 0.6493 - 0.0319 - 0.1722 - 2.4415 0.42 2.72 0.0412 
 (0.1945) (1.3284) (0.8939) (0.0831) (0.3118) (6.809)    
Iron and Steel - 0.4745*** 
(0.1462) 
- 2.3347 
(1.7504) 
- 0.8303*** 
(0.2629) 
0.0411 
(0.0325) 
0.3912** 
(0.1807) 
- 8.8493 
(14.9038) 
0.64 7.40 0.1287 
Machinery - 0.0094 0.1354 - 0.9026 - 0.0432 0.0462 4.8580 0.90 5.50 - 0.0663 
 (0.1600) (0.1573) (1.3723) (0.0379) (0.4437) (3.6685)    
Transport Equipment 0.3931 
(0.2863) 
- 2.9548** 
(1.3232) 
- 0.9192 
(0.6803) 
0.0180 
(0.0262) 
0.8165 
(0.6111) 
5.9757 
(12.0548) 
0.90 5.50 - 0.0663 
Non-Ferrous Metals - 0.1292 
(0.1562) 
0.4453 
(9.2387) 
- 0.0765 
(0.2227) 
0.0192 
(0.0231) 
- 0.0522 
(0.1578) 
99.8361* 
(59.341) 
0.28 1.65 0.0277 
Non-Metallic Minerals - 0.4089* 
(0.2234) 
0.9708 
(5.8474) 
- 0.7470 
(0.7213) 
0.1170 
(0.1174) 
- 0.3337 
(0.3058) 
5.4763 
(21.5337) 
0.36 2.15 0.1052 
Paper - 0.3015* 0.2964 0.2624 0.0966** 0.0173 30.0144*** 0.77 12.57 0.0718 
 (0.1693) (0.6340) (0.4128) (0.0450) (0.0381) (5.6951)    
Textiles  - 0.5183*** 2.8072* 1.1598 - 0.0426** - 0.1660 - 23.1631** 0.69 8.41 0.1461 
 (0.1459) (1.5751) (1.2021) (0.0204) (0.1246) (10.8028)    
Wood - 0.1014 - 0.4483 - 1.3205** 0.0001 - 0.0080 26.0902 0.78 11.51 0.0214 
 (0.1266) (1.6638) (0.3985) (0.0348) (0.0210) (17.3229)    
          
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 
